ensuring that sufficient food is available mantanng relatvely stable food supples allowng access to food for those n need of t ensurng the bologcal utlsaton of food.
Like other Asian countries, however, food security in China almost exclusively has meant food self-sufficiency, or grain self-sufficiency. A 95 per cent grain self-sufficiency level has been set as the target. The followings are some of the arguments made for Chna to mantan a certan rate of grain self-sufficiency and responses to these arguments.
First, China is a very large country in population terms and cannot rely on the world market for ts food supples. Brown (1995) panted a terrfyng pcture of Chna's food supply and demand to the effect that a food shortage n Chna would severely deplete world food supples and hurt other developng countres. Although Brown's arguments were dsmssed by the Chinese government and scholars, they increased concerns about Chna's food supply capacty.
Second, food is a special good and the independence of food supply has poltcal and economc mportance. Some people even fear the possblty of a food embargo as China has many ideological, political and strategic differences with major western powers. However, Lu (1997) and Yang (2000) point out that a food embargo against China is unlikely. Globally, food was often excluded from lsts of embargoed commodtes n the past because of humanitarian considerations. Moreover, a food embargo is difficult to apply and often means even hgher economc costs for the countres that ntate the embargo.
Third, as many Chinese farmers earn their income exclusively from producing food, they may be badly hurt by cheaper food prices after WTO accesson (Zhou 2001) . Ths knd of mpact has been seen prevously n China and other developing countries. For example, in order to solve their food surplus problem in the early 1930s, a number of countries, including the United States, dumped a huge amount of food into the Chinese market and significantly depressed food prices. As a result, many Chinese farmers went bankrupt and Chna's gran sector was serously njured (Xu 1996) .
Chapter 6 (this volume) discusses the income effects, especially the • • • • regional income disparity impacts, of WTO accession. It was concluded that although Chna's WTO accesson rases the real ncome and welfare of rural and urban households in all regions, regional income disparity and rural-urban inequality will worsen as the richer eastern region receives most of the welfare gans of accesson. Ths chapter focuses on the food securty ssue.
China's achievements in food security and food self sufficiency policies
Chna's achevements n food securty Chna has made great progress n provdng food securty for ts people since the economic reforms began in 1978. According to FAO statistics, the average per capta daly food consumpton n Chna was only 2017 calores in 1979, well below the world average of 2500 and below the average of 2200 for other developing countries at that time. By 2001, it had increased by about 47 per cent to 2963 calories-above the world average of 2800. Nutrtonal ntake and food qualty have also mproved. Chna had made the greatest achevement n reducng undernourshment n both absolute and relative terms. During the period from 1990-92 to 1998-2000, China reduced the number of undernourished people by 70 million, or by 7 percentage points (FAO 2002) . Gran producton and household ncomes have ncreased as well. Total and per capta gran producton ncreased at annual rates of 1.9 and 0.7 per cent, respectively, from 1978 to 2002. Per capita incomes of rural and urban households increased by 7.4 and 6.3 per cent per annum, respectively, over the same period (Table 7 .1). The food self-sufficiency target has also been well maintained. In 2001, both total grain and total food self-sufficiency rates were above 95 per cent (Table 7 .2).
These achevements were brought about by the agrcultural economc reforms, especially the rural household responsibility system and market reform for producton factors and agrcultural commodtes (Ln 1997) . Between 1979 and 1984, when the household responsibility system began, the growth in agricultural total factor productivity (TFP) jumped to 5.1 per cent per annum, compared to the -0.25 per cent per annum prevailing between 1952 and 1978. Agricultural TFP growth was kept at 3.9 per cent per annum from the late 1980s through to the early 1990s (Fan 1997) . Market reform has also been remarkable. In 1978, the prices of 93 per cent of agricultural commodities were fixed by government and the prices of another 2 per cent were 'guided' by the government, leaving only 6 per cent to the market. In 1999, the composition was virtually reversed. The prices of 83 per cent of agricultural commodities were determined by the market (Table 7 .3).
Although the growth in agricultural productivity has been remarkable, food consumpton measured n terms of daly per capta calore consumpton has grown at an even hgher rate (see Table 7 .1). Ths dfference mples that Chna's achevements n food securty are manly due to ncreases n household ncomes.
Food security policies in China
China's food security policies have aimed at increasing grain self-sufficiency and food availability to households, especially urban households. These policies have included self-sufficiency policies, grain marketing policies, and gran reserve polces (Lohmar 2002) . 1 Grain self-sufficiency has been vigorously targeted since 1995, partly because of the 'wakeup call' by Brown (1995) . Grain self-sufficiency is not only required at the national level, but also at local level. Under the Governor Grain Bag Policy (GGBP) established in 1995, provincial governors are required to be responsible for grain self-sufficiency in their jurisdictions. In order to fulfil their targets, governors have instructed their subordinates to increase sown areas, yields and grain production. As a result, almost every locality has its own grain production quota to fill.
The side effects of attempting to achieve grain self-sufficiency at local level are obvous. Increases n gran producton have been acheved at the cost of efficiency losses as the practice ignores regional comparative advantages. Ths polcy has been relaxed followng WTO accesson. At the national level, provinces are classified into three categories: major grain production provinces, provinces with balanced grain production and consumption, and net grain importing provinces. Major grain production provnces have comparatve advantage n gran producton and are thus encouraged to ncrease gran producton. Other provnces are allowed to mport grans from other regons and overseas to meet the local demand.
Associated with the grain self-sufficiency and availability policies are gran marketng and prcng polces. The Chnese government has ntervened n gran producton and markets usng procurement quotas and contracts and dfferent types of prces through the network of state owned grain bureaus and stations. Before the rural reforms began in 1979, the goals of these polces were to produce ample and cheap food for urban residents and to export farm products, to earn hard currency for importing advanced technology and equipment, and to develop industries n urban areas.
Since the economic reforms began, grain marketing and pricing policies have been significantly changed. 2 Polcy has been focused on mprovement of farmers' incomes and long term food security and self-sufficiency (Ke 1999) . The government attempts to counter price volatility through government procurement prces and sales prces: n a year of bumper crops the procurement price sets a floor price so that farmers are not hurt by falling market prices; while in a year of poor harvests, the government sells reserves to cap the soarng market prce.
However, such price stabilisation practices send the wrong signal to farmers and make the situation even worse, as evidenced by the 'grain surplus crss' n recent years. In a bd to ncrease gran producton and farmers' incomes, the government significantly raised the procurement prices in 1994 and 1996-by 40 per cent each time; as a result, grain production kept increasing. In 1998, the total grain output reached 504.5 million tons, well above the upper range of the target set for the year 2000. Although the open market price started falling from the end of 1997, as the higher government procurement price is 'guaranteed', output failed to adjust. As a result, on the one hand some farmers faced difficulties in selling their grains, resulting in political difficulties. On the other hand, the agency implementing the price protection policy, the state owned grain sector, accumulated huge losses. An estimate by Zhang and Li (1998) indicates that the amount of non-performng loans owed by the state gran sector to the Chnese Agrcultural Development Bank reached 21.4 bllon yuan.
These huge losses by the state grain sector were completely unacceptable, and grain marketing and distribution system reforms initiated in May 1998 were desgned to reduce the losses. Despte the contnung asserton that the government buys the grain from farmers at protected prices, the new polces requred state gran agences to sell gran at a prce that covers the full costs incurred and preferably with a small profit margin. The state grain agencies were also asked to improve their operational efficiency through redundances and other measures.
The orgnal dea was gradually to lberalse the gran markets so that government procurement prces would move close to market prces. However, due to the fundamental flaw in the design of the policy, that is, that the state grain sector was asked to carry out two conflicting duties-to act as a government agency mplementng the protecton prce polcy and to achieve financial soundness as a commercial entity-after one year the declnng trend n gran prces ncreased and the government subsdy contnued to soar. The government realsed the problem and slghtly changed the policy in mid May 1999. The remedies included reducing the scope of the prce support coverage and the support prce levels and allowng gran processng and feed ndustres to purchase gran drectly from farmers.
Another drect approach to achevng food securty has been the state gran reserve polcy. The natonal government controls a large amount of reserve grain stocks. However the volume of stocks held is a state secret. The state stocks are managed by the State Admnstraton for Gran Reserves (SAGR) and held by the grain bureaus. When there is a grain shortage, reserves are sold to put downwards pressure on prices. However, the management of state held stocks s seen as beng too bureaucratcally constrained to effectively reduce price volatility (Lohmar 2002) . Moreover, mantanng the stockple s expensve. Nyberg and Rozelle (1999) estmate that the costs of carrying over one ton of wheat, rice and corn were about US$42, US$6 and US$39, respectively, being equivalent to over 20 per cent of the prce of each commodty on the world market.
The impact on agricultural production and food security of WTO accession
Chna's WTO accesson commtments n agrculture Chna's commtments n agrculture are more far reachng than those n manufactured goods. They include the reduction in tariff rates, adoption of a tariff rate quota system, limits on domestic support and on export subsidies for agricultural products, and the elimination of some technical trade barrers.
Chna agreed to reduce the average statutory tarff rate for agrcultural products from 22 per cent to 15 per cent by January 2004. It also agreed to adopt the tarff rate quota system for key agrcultural products such as wheat, rice and corn. Within the specified import quota, which is scheduled to increase over time, the tariff rate for these three grain products is only 1 per cent (Table 7 .4). The state owned agricultural trading firms no longer enjoy the monopoly power they previously had, as private firms have been allowed to enter the foreign trade market and to import any unfulfilled quota left by the state owned firms.
However, these commitments do not necessarily lead to significant adverse mpacts on agrcultural producton as Chna already had relatvely low protection on agriculture. For example, the nominal rates of protection for rice, vegetables and fruits and meats are negative (Table 7 .5). This stuaton was partly due to the hstory of taxng agrculture to subsdse ndustral development and partly due to the effort of reducng protecton along wth the WTO accesson negotatons.
Overall mpacts of WTO accesson
Smulatons of the mpacts of WTO accesson were carred out usng the closure of no control on the trade balance; that is, the exchange rate is fixed and the trade balance is endogenous. The macroeconomic impacts of Chna's WTO accesson are summarsed n Table 7.6. Several ponts can be drawn from the smulaton results.
First, China has an overall gain from WTO accession. Real GDP, consumption and the utility level increase, by 0.4, 1.0 and 0.8 per cent, respectively. The welfare improvement, measured by the equivalent variation (EV), amounts to 58.2 billion yuan. Second, the tariff reductions lead to lower prices of imports, which, in turn, result in lower overall prices. The consumer price index (CPI) and GDP deflator decline by 2.2 and 1.8 per cent, respectively. Because of the cheaper domestic prices, the terms of trade decline by 0.4 per cent.
Third, both imports and exports increase after the tariff cut by 19.0 and 11.1 per cent, respectively. As imports increase more than the exports, the trade balance declines by about 34 billion yuan.
Fourth, the impacts of WTO accession are not evenly distributed. Crops, food processing, motor vehicle and parts, and the machinery sectors are adversely affected while the other sectors benefit. The motor vehicle and parts sector is the hardest hit while light industry benefits most. In terms of regional distribution, almost all the benefits go to the eastern coastal regon. Ths s because the eastern regon has the hghest proporton of boomng sectors. Ths pattern of mpact mples that the regonal ncome dsparty worsens after WTO accesson. Chapter 6 (ths volume) dscusses ths ssue n more detal.
Impact of WTO accesson on agrculture and food securty
The impacts of WTO accession on production, exports, imports and selfsufficiency of agricultural products are reported in Tables 7.7-7.10. Although agricultural imports and exports change significantly, the imported volume is still within the quota, and the contraction of output is limited. For most grains, the reduction in output is less than 1 per cent. Consequently, the impact on grain and food self-sufficiency is also limited and the target rate of 95 per cent self-sufficiency is likely to be achieved.
Grains production in the eastern region declines the most, while that n the central regon declnes the least. Ths result s n lne wth the comparatve advantage of regonal agrcultural producton. Compared to the eastern region, the central region has a relatively abundant labour force and land resources. Compared to the western region, the central region has more favourable weather conditions, and arable land resources are also relatvely abundant.
However, food security may still be an issue even if the self-sufficiency target is achieved. This is because the benefits and costs of accession are not evenly distributed across regions and households. Even if the overall benefit is larger than the cost, for those engaged mainly in the contracting sectors, food nsecurty caused by the reducton n ncome may be a problem. Ths is especially important for rural households in inland regions. For example, the real wage n agrcultural sectors n the central regon declnes after the WTO accesson (Table 7 .11). 3 Table 7 .11 also shows that rural household ncome ncreases to a smaller extent than urban household ncome; that is, the rural-urban income inequality worsens. 
Policy implications and conclusion
The smulaton results reported above show that agrcultural sectors wll be adversely affected by the WTO accession: agricultural output falls, grain and total food self-sufficiency rates decline, and rural-urban income inequality worsens. Although the magntudes of the mpacts are smaller than wdely anticipated, the results may still give concern to policymakers. This section dscusses polcy optons to tackle these adverse mpacts.
A drect response to the mpact may be to provde support to agrcultural sectors and farmers. Support can be provided in many forms, with some conformng the WTO rules and others not. Chapter 6 (ths volume) consders a scenaro where the level of tarff cut on agrcultural commodtes s halved because of various forms of new barriers such as labelling requirements, reporting procedures, and so on. The simulation of this scenario using CERD ndcates that although such a polcy may provde some cushonng of agricultural sectors and help to ease the worsening trend of rural-urban income inequality, the overall welfare gain from WTO accession is smallerthe equvalent varaton s 6 per cent less than that of the full tarff cut of the WTO accesson commtments.
Here, support in the form of a production subsidy is considered. It is assumed that the government subsdses farmers at a level that would keep the grain self-sufficiency rate constant after the WTO accession. Simulation of CERD shows that t would cost 7.2 bllon yuan to make up for the tny reduction of 0.06 per cent in the grain self-sufficiency rate (Table 7 .12). If the target were to restore the full decline in the total food self-sufficiency rate (1.5 per cent), the cost would be as high as 180 billion yuan.
Increasng transfer payments to nland regons was also smulated n Chapter 6. The ratonale behnd ths polcy opton s that because the economy as a whole benefits from the WTO accession, there is the possibility of transferrng ncome from one group to another to make all sectors better off. However, the simulation gives a similar result to the scenario of halving the cut in agricultural tariffs. The improvement in regional and rural-urban household ncome dsparty s acheved at the cost of lower overall welfare gains-1 per cent less welfare gain than the full tariff cut scenario. Increases n transfers to the nland regons are made possble through penalsng the coastal regons that have a hgher rate of return.
Another polcy opton s to ncrease agrcultural research and development to improve agricultural productivity in China, as suggested by many authors, for example, Fan, Fang and Zhang (2001) and Hazell and Haddad (2001) . Simulations of CERD were conducted to find out how much productvty mprovement s requred to keep the gran and food self-sufficiency rates constant after WTO accession. It was found that the required productivity improvement is 0.32 and 2.85 per cent, respectively, for constant grain and total food self-sufficiency rates. To give an idea about what these figures mean, agricultural TFP in the past may be used as a benchmark. According to Fan (1997) Agrcultural productvty may be mproved through other channels. One such approach could be reformng the current land tenure system. It s often argued that the average farm sze n Chna s too small to take full advantage of available economies of scale. Without well defined land ownership, farmers are reluctant to invest in land, and the lack of a land market mpedes needed adjustments n Chna's rural economy (Lohmar and Somwaru 2002) . However, secure land tenure is also important so that low-income farmers can have food security. Zhou (1998) finds that Chna's 'dual land system' 4 s superor n terms of avodng generatng new landlessness and inefficient landholding. Further, Ho (2001) finds that many Chinese farmers prefer the current system, especially in poor villages, as it guarantees households access to land. FAO (2002, p.26 ) also shows that the poverty index is negatively related to land holding, and productivity is negatively related to farm size, that is, smaller farms have higher productivity. These findings may prompt second thoughts about the popular idea of increasing farm size, especially in poor regions.
Finally, further liberalisation is also an option. It was suggested in Chapter 6 that domestc market reform charactersed by freer movement of prmary factors and commodtes may enhance overall welfare and mprove regonal ncome dsparty.
In addition, China should promote trade liberalisation globally. China has made significant commitments in trade liberalisation of agricultural products and ts protecton of agrculture s among the lowest n the world. Ths puts Chna n a good poston n the new round of trade lberalsaton negotatons. GTAP smulatons show that the removal of agrcultural protecton n OECD countres mproves the compettveness of Chnese agrcultural products n world markets and ncreases the gran self-sufficiency rate (Yu and Frandsen 2002) .
Notes
1 For a review of broader agricultural policies in China, see Colby, Diao and Tuan (2001) .
2 For an introduction to the evolution of these policies, see Jiang and Duncan (2001) .
3 This seems a puzzle at first glance as the central region has the smallest reduction in almost all agricultural sectors among the three regions. However, as the magnitude of impact varies across sectors and the sectoral composition differs across regions, it turns out that the central regon becomes the hardest ht regon n the agrcultural sector as a whole.
4 Land is divided into self-sufficiency land and responsibility land. Self-sufficiency land, or grain rations land, was equally contracted to households on a per capita basis for plantng manly grans for self-consumpton. The responsblty land was contracted on the conditions of fulfilling state output quotas and paying agricultural taxes and fees.
